Why, after the outbreak of World War II in Eastern Europe, did the inhabitants of some communities erupt in violence against their Jewish neighbors? We hypothesize that the greater the degree of pre-existing inter-communal polarization between Jews and the titular majority group, the more likely a pogrom. We test this proposition using an original dataset of matched census and electoral returns from interwar Poland. Where Jews supported ethnic parties that advocated minority cultural autonomy, the local populations perceived the Jews as an obstacle to the creation of nation-states in which minorities acknowledged the right of the titular majority to impose its culture across a country's entire territory. These communities became toxic. Where determined state elites could politically integrate minorities, pogroms were far less likely to occur. The results point to the theoretical importance of political assimilation and are also consistent with research that extols the virtues of interethnic civic engagement. As for motives, this study points more to the importance of communal indifference than it does to hatred.
Introduction
Two tragedies befell the Jews of Eastern Europe after the outbreak of World War II. The first and by far the best known and exhaustively researched is the Nazi extermination effort. The second, as Żbikowski (1993: 174) eloquently puts it, is "the violent explosion of the latent hatred and hostility of local communities." This paper focuses on the second tragedy, a wave of pogroms that broke out in the aftermath of the 1941 Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union across a broad swath of territory stretching from roughly the Baltic to the Black Seas. It seeks to identify the political features of local communities that led some to erupt in violence against their Jewish neighbors but others to remain quiescent. Why were some communities toxic for Jews and others relatively benign?
We hypothesize that the greater the degree of inter-communal polarization between Jews and the titular majority group, the more likely a pogrom. Where Jews supported ethnic parties that advocated minority cultural autonomy, the local populations perceived the Jews as being insufficiently willing to integrate into society, and thus an obstacle to the creation of nationstates in which minorities acknowledged the right of the titular majority to impose its culture across a country's entire territory. The belief that Jews lay outside the community of solidarity had already produced some anti-Jewish violence even before the war broke out. When war finally did come opportunities for violence soared. The local populations were less likely to protect their Jewish neighbors from external depredation and more likely to commit acts of aggression themselves.
Our geographic focus is Poland, and in particular the Northeastern Białystok and Łomża regions. There are good reasons for this. From a methodological perspective, we believe that to gain traction on the causes of ethnic violence it is important to "scale down" below the cross-national level (Varshney 2002; Wilkinson 2004; Scacco 2008) . Empirically there is a great deal of variation in pogrom occurrence across localities and no explanation of ethnic violence is complete without some accounting for these observed patterns. Yet municipality-level explanations are often challenging due to the dearth of available information-episodes of ethnic violence occurring outside the larger towns may be underreported, and the data to test alternative hypotheses are often lacking. To overcome this problem we capitalize on a rancorous debate among historians concerning one particularly vicious pogrom that occurred in the same region during the same time period in the town of Jedwabne (Gross 2001; Gross 2003; Henning 2001; Sułek 2001; Polonsky and Michlic 2004) . As Gross (2001) sums it up, in one day in July 1941, some 1,600 Jews were killed in Jedwabne when the Polish half of the town killed the Jewish half.
1 Historians have challenged nearly every aspect of Gross's account, and as a consequence there has been an outpouring of research on Jedwabne and the regions surrounding it. Our database of pogroms builds on the work of Gross, Żbikowski, and others who have initiated the painstaking task of reconstructing for a dense network of neighboring localities the circumstances under which pogroms occurred from June-August, 1941, as the German army swept through eastern Poland on the trail of the retreating Soviet army.
The paper is broken up into five sections. In the next section we discuss competing explanations for the pogroms. In the third section we describe the data. Our emphasis on the general ethno-national and political features of the localities where pogroms took place has necessitated making certain simplifying assumptions, which we describe and justify. The fourth section compares localities where pogroms took place with places where they did not take place.
We find that the greater the proportion of Jews supporting parties advocating cultural autonomy, the greater the probability of a pogrom. In section five we provide additional evidence for the importance of intercommunal polarization and we illustrate the mix of motives and emotions at work with testimony from one pogrom. We show that in localities where minorities could be politically integrated by determined state elites, pogroms were far less likely to occur.
Explaining Pogroms
In There is little question whether Poles and Jews were already polarized before the outbreak of the Second World War. Divided by religion and language, often enough each group also occupied different economic niches and social strata, and passed down among themselves the "sins" of the other group (Golczewski 1981; Michlic 2006) . On the Polish side such differences were emphasized and nurtured by political parties such as the National Democrats (known in Polish as the Endecja in reference to the letters N and D), a powerful right-wing Polish nationalist party that saw advantages in stoking antagonism.
We identify two dimensions of polarization. The first is economic. The study of the economic roots of ethnic violence has a long pedigree in comparative politics (Bonacich 1972; Horowitz 1985; Forbes 1997) and economic tensions certainly existed in interwar Poland. As Polonsky (1972: 59) notes, the National Democrats' party program called for "the securing of the Polish character of the towns, of industry and trade as one of the most pressing needs of national policy." Although aimed at all minorities, the Jews were a particular target. At just under 10 percent of the population, according to figures from the late 1920's and early 1930's, Jews comprised over 70 percent of university graduates (Marcus 1983: 67) , over 70 percent of those employed in commerce (Tomaszewski 1989: 147) The Starosta [district head] told me that the man behind the disturbances was a lawyer named Jursz leader of the National Democrats, but he never takes part in the riots personally. I sent for him. He was not at home, so I left word to tell him that Skladkowski was here and said that if riots occur, he will be sent to Bereza (concentration camp) and will be freed only if for one month after his incarceration no riots will occur. When, therefore, riots took place, we sent him to Bereza. After six weeks, we freed him, no riots having occurred…During the time of his imprisonment they evidently endeavored not to provoke riots, and none occurred (Segal 1938: 89) .
As one pogrom participant testified during his (post-war) trial: "We all belonged to the endecja. '' 7 Yet although Endecja anti-Semitism represents but one end of a broad spectrum of Polish opinion, most Polish parties opposed Jewish national autonomy within Poland (Mendelsohn 1983: 39) . At a fundamental level this pitted them against most Jewish (and other nationalities') parties, which in varying degrees fought for Jewish national rights such as local self-government, Hebrew and Yiddish education, and in the case of the Orthodox, adhering to a traditional way of life. In Northeastern Poland the most important of such political groupings was the Bloc of National Minorities, a cross-ethnic electoral alliance founded by a Zionist party leader. As described by Mendelsohn (1983: 53-54) , it was built on the idea that all the minorities shared a similar interest in gaining national autonomy. The best strategy to achieve this, given electoral districts and rules favoring the Polish majority, was to form a united front. Popular support for Since there is no variation in state breakdown across Northeastern Poland, breakdown per se cannot logically account for spatial variation within that region. Second, as the Germans began to assume control of eastern Poland, they encouraged Poles to initiate pogroms. This is clear from a July 1, 1941 order given by Nazi Security Police Chief Reinhard Heydrich to the Einsatzgruppen, mobile killing units charged with eliminating "undesirable groups" in the eastern territories. The order stipulated that, unless considered especially dangerous, Poles should not be including in "cleansing actions, especially as they are of great importance as elements for initiating pogroms and for obtaining information." 8 Moreover, Stola (2004: 390) notes that the type of killing that took place in several locations, especially in July and August
1941, indicates a degree of planning and coordination, sometimes between German and local
Polish authorities.
A similar argument can be made for the inter-ethnic civic engagement networks that
Varshney (2002) 
Data and Methods
We construct our pogrom database from historical narratives about wartime Poland, particularly Żbikowski (2002) and Dmitrów (2002) . A common danger with such a procedure is that sources often suffer from selection bias: the narratives may focus only on the larger and well-known incidents, making it difficult to infer what happened in places not mentioned. We compensate for this by checking the results against more comprehensive reference works related to the period, such as Rubin (2006) . The result yielded 37 pogroms across 231 localities.
Our data on the ethnic and political characteristics of localities are drawn from published results of the 1921 census and the 1922 and 1928 national parliamentary election results, which we then match. 11 We acknowledge the limitations of these data but they nonetheless remain the best systematic information we have on the distribution of ethnic affiliation and political preference across Poland's localities. Regarding the census data, which is known to have overcounted the number of Poles, we follow Tomaszewski (1985) and employ religion rather than national affiliation. Thus, Poles are assumed to be Roman Catholic, Belarusians Orthodox, and Jews (żydowską) Jews (mojżeszowego). Of course this solution does not solve the problem of using 1921 data to approximate 1941 conditions, but that is a drawback we must live with.
12
The electoral data suffer from similar limitations of temporal proximity to the event of interest. Unfortunately, no nationwide election after 1928 was free and fair enough to provide a reliable snapshot of political preferences. Given what we know about the course of politics after 1928, it is safe to say that our measure is likely to underestimate the influence of polarization.
The reason is the influence of the National Democrats steadily increased during the early 1930's, and made huge inroads after Piłsudski's death in 1935. 13 One upshot of the temporal distance between our measure of polarization and the acts of violence is that it is clear that polarization is not itself endogenous to the violence, as in other cases.
14 Another feature of the electoral data is that the results were published mainly for cities and rural communes (gminas). This poses a problem of matching the electoral with the pogrom data when the latter refer to townships that did not have their electoral data published.
Fortunately in Białystok there were only a few such instances, and in these cases we matched the pogrom data with the corresponding gmina of which the municipality was a part.
We examine the relationship between inter-communal polarization and pogroms in two ways. First, we sub-divide the sample according to whether a pogrom did or did not occur and present descriptive demographic and electoral statistics. The purpose of this is to establish some prima facie differences that do not rely on any statistical assumptions. Second, we run a series of logit analyses with the dichotomous pogrom variable as the outcome. We hypothesize that intercommunal polarization increases the likelihood of pogroms. A logit analysis will allow us to establish the effects of polarization independent of alternative hypotheses such as support for the Soviet occupation.
In each of the above steps we face the problem of ecological inference. For any given locality we know how many votes were given to a particular party and how many of each ethnic group dwelled there. What we do not know, except in cases of homogeneous settlements, is what proportion of a given ethnic group supported a particular party. This is important because our measure of political polarization relies not on how well nationalist and minorities' parties performed, but on Polish support for the National Democrats (Endecja) and Jewish support for the Bloc of National Minorities. These quantities must be computed. We thus make two further simplifying assumptions. The first is that the fraction of voters for a particular group reflects their fraction of the total population as recorded in the census. This discounts differential turnout rates across groups but is not wholly unreasonable. Second, we assume that only Poles support the Endecja and only non-Poles (Jews in particular) support the Bloc of National Minorities.
These assumptions are not perfect, but they are reasonable. Third, and ironically, the relationship between communist support and the later occurrence of a pogrom is the opposite of what one would expect given the importance attributed to alleged Jewish collaboration with the Soviet occupation. Although communist support was low everywhere, it was three times as low in places that would later experience a pogrom. Our hunch is that this result reflects two significant but unappreciated facts about the sociology of communist support in interwar Poland. The first is that at the mass level the communists did not attract many votes from Jews (Kopstein and Wittenberg 2003) . The second is that areas where communist sympathy was strong among non-Jews were not fertile ground for those wishing to instigate anti-Jewish violence. The communists did not recoil from violence but it was directed more at class enemies than at ethnic ones. indicating whether or not a municipality was a shtetl (a small market town). In order to illustrate the effect of using different indicators for the key concepts, we present the results in four different models. Table 2 illustrates the importance of disaggregating our conceptualization of polarization, which contains both a political dimension (the sum of Jewish support for the Minorities Bloc and
Polish support for the Endecja) and an economic one (whether a municipality was a shtetl). First, although political polarization has little effect on the outcome (model 1), this is because the occurrence of a pogrom has far more to do with Jewish political behavior than with Polish (Models 2-4). Consistent with Table 1 but contrary to substantial anecdotal evidence, the strength of Polish nationalism (Polish Endecja Vote) has no effect on the probability of a pogrom. What mattered more was Jewish support for a party advocating ethnic particularism.
Such support is best seen in model 4, which encompassed far more observations due to the exclusion of Communist Vote, which was missing for many areas of Northeastern Poland.
Second, although Jewish wealth was plundered in the course of the pogroms, such plunder was not more likely to occur in localities where economic tensions between Jews and Gentiles are likely to have been the highest, in the small market towns (the Shtetl variable in Models 1-4). In the end, polarization does matter, but not exactly in the way we initially thought.
There is also support in Table 2 for the collaboration thesis, but again not as originally hypothesized. The probability of a pogrom does increase as the fraction of Jews increases (Models 3-4), but the communist vote has the opposite effect. Contrary to claims that pogroms are about revenge being taken for siding with the Soviet occupation, communist support seems to provide strong and robust immunization against pogroms (Models 1-2). This is doubly ironic because places with strong communist support during the interwar period are likely to have been the most welcoming of the Soviet occupation and therefore ought to have been the first targets of pogroms. Our finding also constitutes indirect evidence that, contrary to the views of Wierzbicki (2007) and "Polish nationalist" historians, who see the pogroms as anti-Soviet rather than antiJewish actions, exactly the reverse is true.
To gauge the magnitude of the effects (which are not directly interpretable from the coefficients), we compute the predicted probabilities of a pogrom occurrence for Model 4 based on different values for the number of Jews and minority support for the Bloc of National Minorities, setting the other explanatory variables at their "average" values in the sample. First, if all variables are set at their means, the expected probability of a pogrom occurring is 5 percent (2,10). 19 Thus, there is a low probability of a pogrom occurring in the "average'' locality. This is not surprising given that most localities do not experience a pogrom. Having a large number of Jews dramatically raises the probability of a pogrom: when the fraction of Jews is set to the 90th percentile in the data (49 percent) and other factors are set at their means, the probability of a pogrom increases to 58 percent (17,90). Jewish towns were clearly targets. If a large proportion of Jews opts for the Minorities' Bloc (70 percent, the 90th percentile) but other factors are held at their means, the probability of a pogrom rises to 12 percent (4,27). Jews living as a local minority were especially vulnerable if they were seen to opt for ethnic particularism. If, however, both the number of Jews and minority support are at their 90th percentile, the probability of a pogrom skyrockets to 77 percent (44, 96) . Settlements with large numbers of Jews who supported the strongest advocate for Jewish national rights more than likely fell victim to pogroms. They hung up their swastika flag and pushed on further. The city lay in chaos. Authority passed to the hands of the Poles. This lasted about two weeks. All kinds of rowdies were let out of prison: Dombrovski Yakubtshuk, the well known Polish arrestees under the BolsheviksShviatlovski, chief of the guard and Yankayitis, the director of the school, and others. They were full of rancor for the Bolsheviks and the Jews. Friday night [June 25] when the entire city slept quietly, the slaughter began. They [the Poles] had organized it very well: one gang in the new section, a second in the marketeplace, a third on Lomzher Street….There in the new section they murdered Romorovske's family (the tailor), Esther Krieger (your neighbor with the youngest daughter), Soreh Beylkeh, Eynikl, Pishke, Yashinski, Mayzler (the head of the yeshivah)-all in their own houses….and many more. They had killed Rozental's children in the marketplace. They had also killed Kheytshe with her six month old child at breast and her older boy Grishen….Later the squads divided up the possessions of their victims amongst themselves. On readied wagons they loaded the corpses and led them just outside of the town. The goys immediately washed the bloodied floors including the stones on the street. A few hundred sacrifices had taken place in one night and still, the murderers informed us, the massacres would continue for two more nights.
Discussion
The elements are all there. The Soviet occupation, the collapse of authority, the riot agitators, the hatred and fear, the rage of the nationalist crowd, the thirst for revenge, blood, and, booty and, ultimately, the intimate violence are all contained within this short narrative. What came next, however, provides crucial clues to the permissive communal context in which the pogrom could occur and deepen.
Those remaining were stricken with fear. What do we do? How can we save ourselves? My mother ran to the priests to beg for the Jews. They offered no help. With Chana, Libe, Zeml, and Salen, I ran to the Polish intelligentsia. There too we found no salvation. My mother with two other women ran after help in Grayeve [a nearby town]; they were not let into the towncurfew. What do we do? Night was falling upon us. Approximately 20 Germans entered the city-a field troupe. We were afraid to show ourselves before them. Then I had an idea: to try our luck with the soldiers, maybe they would help us. With great difficulty we chose a delegation and departed. The group of Germans consisted of soldiers and two officers. In the beginning they declined to help us, "This is not our business, we are fighting on the front, not with civilians," they explained. However, when I offered them soap and coffee, they softened up. They guarded the city at night and all remained quiet. I, with two other women, began to work for them, and later we were placed to work in the German headquarters. And so, in this manner, the pogroms in Szczuczyn were stopped for awhile.
This passage strongly indicates that what allowed the pogrom to get off the ground and intensify was not merely hatred, hostility, and rage but also the quite obvious indifference of key members of the local Polish community toward the fate of the town's Jews. Szczuczyn's Jewish women expected something different. Their first instinct once they understood their predicament was to turn to the priest and the intelligentsia, whom they believed could have stopped the bloodshed.
But neither the priest nor the intelligentsia--a broad category in Eastern Europe that refers to the prominent and educated, especially doctors, lawyers, and school teachers-none were moved by the frantic appeals of the petrified Jewish women to intervene, a point stressed in several testimonies written at different times and places (Ibid). Neither lifted a finger or showed any sign of solidarity with their fellow citizens. The women did not encounter hatred in their demarches; they reported no reaction, "no help," "no salvation," nothing. They met indifference.
Whether they also offered "soap" and "coffee" to these men remains unknown. It is also difficult to determine whether the town's Polish spiritual and educated elite set the tone for the pogrom or merely reacted to the context in which they lived. Our statistical analysis, however, Piłsudski saw the danger posed by the National Democrats and ultimately seized power in a coup. His plan was for a reconstructed, technocratic, and ethnically tolerant, albeit authoritarian, party to guide the country to a "statist'' as opposed to an "ethnic'' order. 22 The vehicle for this plan was the BBWR, which was not a typical political party with grass-roots organizations. The leadership at the local level consisted primarily of state officials and local dignitaries. inference is to estimate where in that range the actual level of support is most likely to be.
TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE
The results appear in Table 3 , which illustrates the estimated percentages of Poles and Jews who supported the BBWR in both pogrom and non-pogrom localities. These findings buttress our earlier evidence that the defining electoral characteristic of pogrom localities is the behavior of Jews rather than Poles. There is no significant difference in Polish support for the BBWR between pogrom sites (30 percent) and non-pogrom sites (28 percent). The same cannot be said for Jewish support, which rises from 9 percent where pogroms occurred to 21 percent where they did not. Jews who supported the BBWR were making a choice in favor of greater integration into Polish society.
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Most historians maintain that Jewish support for the BBWR came from a mixture of semi-skilled artisans, small merchants, and the Orthodox community (Bacon 1996) . It is difficult, therefore, to maintain that this integration was a form of cultural, much less religious, assimilation. What it was, however, was a form of political assimilation that may have constituted one possible path to reducing the hostility and indifference between Poles and their Jewish neighbors at the local level. This kind of assimilation was not the thick solidarity of a nation, but it may nevertheless have provided just enough communal cohesion, the bare minimum, to prevent the worst sort of depredations when all other factors pointed in that direction.
Of course, it is hard to say whether the BBWR succeeded in reducing polarization or simply received a greater share of the vote in municipalities already less polarized. Since it was led by state officials at the local level, it stands to reason, however, that its success was a function the ability of these officials to partially reconcile Poles and non-Poles. In the years after 1928 these officials, the "Piłsudskiites,'' may have had the skill and resources to continue this project well into 1930s. That, at any rate, was the plan, at least until Piłsudski's death in 1935.
28
Yet whether the BBWR's popularity was a cause or a consequence of decreased polarization, the political integration of a sizable portion of all groups under the BBWR umbrella was a defining characteristic of non-pogrom localities.
Conclusion
This paper makes two contributions. First, to return to our main hypothesis, we find that nationalist ideology and organization is less predictive of pogroms than the failure of the Polish state to politically integrate its Jewish citizens and the decision of many Jews to opt for ethnic particularism. Inter-communal polarization is more about the behavior of Jews than that of Poles.
This finding should not be interpreted as blaming the victims. Jewish support for the Minorities'
Bloc did not mean implacable resistance to integrating into Poland's social and political life.
Representatives of the parties of minorities in the Sejm would have jumped at the opportunity to be part of a governing coalition, but they were never given the chance. Although Jews appeared on the electoral lists of other "Polish'' parties, in the end not one Jewish (or Ukrainian, German, or Belarusian) cabinet minister from among the minority parties was chosen in the entire interwar era. Responsibility for that properly lies with the "Polish'' parties who were forming governments, not with the Jews who were seeking the best way to address their communal concerns. At the same time, it is clear that Poles were reacting to the perceived unwillingness of Jews to assimilate into Polish political life.
Second, our study points to the potential theoretical importance of political assimilation in fostering the absolute minimum of solidarity for preventing inter-communal violence.
Although the term assimilation has a checkered history in social science, our data suggest that it may be worth invoking in a revised form (Brubaker, 2001) . Assimilation in politics need not be thought of as changing as something as fundamental as "identity" but, rather, as a new willingness to engage in an act as simple and mundane as joining with fellow citizens in supporting the same political party. In this limited sense our findings are consistent with those of Varshney (2002) , who extols the advantages of inter-ethnic civic engagement. Esteban and Ray (1994: 819-852 ).
3 For a detailed discussion of life in the interwar shtetl, see Kassow (1989: 198-220) .
4 See http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Shtetl. Accessed May 3, 2009.
5 Polonsky (1972: 52-61) . See also Porter (2000: 227-232) . 6 The role of local networks is also highlighted in Scacco 2008.
7 Żbikowski (2002: 97) .
8 Ereignismeldungen UdSSR, no. 10, 2 July 1941, Bundesarchiv, Berlin, R. 58/214, 52-53. Cited in Musiał (2004: 336) .
9 "An outburst of joy and relief was the overwhelming reaction of the Jews in many of the shtetlach of Eastern Poland to the entry of the Soviet army. It is true that there were those who followed with apprehension and misgivings the advancing columns of the Red Army, and for good reasons. Yet at the moment of first encounter the dominant sentiment in 'the Jewish street' was that they were rescued." Pinchuk (1990: 21) . 10 For a comprehensive review of ethnic relations under Soviet occupation in this region, see Wierzbicki (2000) . On Łomża in particular, see Gnatowski (1997; . For first-person narrative accounts, see Bardach (1998) and Grudzinska-Gross (1981) .
11 See Główny Urząd Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (1924) and L'Office Central de Statistique de la République Polonaise (1926, 1930) . 12 In the one region of Poland for which we have 1939 population data at the settlement level, Eastern Galicia, the correlation between the fraction of Jews in 1921 and 1939 is .97.
13 Mendelsohn (1983: 73-74) . Among the many Jewish issues occupying Polish political discourse in this period were the campaign against, and extensive Sejm debate over, (Jewish) ritual slaughter, the establishment of ghetto benches at universities, and, most seriously, the economic boycott of Jewish businesses that was connected to pogroms in the 1930s.
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